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We studied the severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) outbreak in Taiwan, using the daily case-reporting
data from May 5 to June 4 to learn how it had spread so
rapidly. Our results indicate that most SARS-infected per-
sons had symptoms and were admitted before their infec-
tions were reclassified as probable cases. This finding
could indicate efficient admission, slow reclassification
process, or both. The high percentage of nosocomial infec-
tions in Taiwan suggests that infection from hospitalized
patients with suspected, but not yet classified, cases is a
major factor in the spread of disease. Delays in reclassifi-
cation also contributed to the problem. Because accurate
diagnostic testing for SARS is currently lacking, interven-
tion measures aimed at more efficient diagnosis, isolation
of suspected SARS patients, and reclassification proce-
dures could greatly reduce the number of infections in
future outbreaks. 
O
n April 22, 2003, the World Health Organization
(WHO) reported 3,947 probable severe acute respira-
tory syndrome (SARS) cases with 229 deaths worldwide
(1); China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Vietnam, and Toronto,
Canada, had the most cases. At that time, Taiwan had 29
probable cases and no deaths. Seventy-eight percent of its
cases were imported, and the growth seemed to be expo-
nential but at a comparatively slow rate (2), typical of a
minor outbreak. A new cluster of seven infections in
Hoping Hospital in Taipei was reported on that day (3),
however, starting a chain of local transmissions that cumu-
lated in 116 probable cases and 10 deaths in a fortnight. In
the days that followed, the numbers grew to 264 cases and
34 deaths by mid-May, and 680 cases and 81 deaths by
June 1—more than a sixfold increase in <l month.
Many questions arose as to how SARS was able
to spread so rapidly in Taiwan, a full 2 months after the
global alert posted by WHO and >1 month after its passage
through Hong Kong, Singapore, and other neighboring
countries (4). Inexperience at containing outbreaks and the
lack of expert assistance from WHO, at the least at the
beginning (5), certainly contributed to the problem. So did
inadequacies in the health infrastructure, hospital misman-
agement, and simple human carelessness. Hsieh and Chen
(2) observed that the cumulative number of probable cases
exhibited seemingly random variations in the period after
April 22, a feature that cannot be captured by simple
curve-fitting techniques. We studied the waves of infec-
tions that occurred in most of May by using a mathemati-
cal model tailor-made to the specifics of the SARS out-
break in Taiwan but simple enough to allow researchers to
draw inferences. 
Riley et al. (6) and Lipsitch et al. (7) used dynamic
models to model the respective transmission dynamics of
SARS in Hong Kong and Singapore. The models were
complex and general dynamic models, and they allowed
researchers to calculate numerous epidemiologically
important parameters and assess the potential danger of the
epidemic. Many questions remain, however, such as the
effect of data quality on results and the role of heterogene-
ity in disease transmission (8). We aimed to circumvent
problems in answering these questions with a simple math-
ematical model useful to our understanding of the out-
break.
Methods
We proposed a dynamic model to reflect the actual
sequence of events for a reported case-patient in Taiwan,
from onset to admission at a hospital as a suspected case-
patient to either reclassification as a probable case-patient
or removal from the suspected SARS category, and finally
reclassification from probable case to discharged case or
fatality. Our goal was to evaluate the dynamics at work that
resulted in rapid epidemic growth during the period
observed. We chose to use a discrete difference equation
model because the data used are the discrete daily numbers
of reported suspected cases, probable cases, and accumu-
lated deaths posted on the Taiwan Center for Disease
Control Web site (9).
Starting from the Hoping Hospital cluster in Taipei on
April 22, the large numbers of cases reported daily
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SARS, at times to near-panic state. Amid the heightened
tension, the health authority tried to enforce stringent
measures to contain the outbreak. One measure was
reporting, admitting, and hospitalizing all persons sus-
pected of having SARS. Another was the house quaran-
tine of tens of thousands of persons, mainly those with
contacts to the suspected case-patients and to arrivals
from affected areas abroad. The quarantine was frequent-
ly broken and yielded only 45 probable cases out of over
131,000 people quarantined (10). However, the suspected
case-patients who were admitted to the hospital led to the
discovery of many probable SARS case-patients. For
most of May, the ratio between the number of probable
cases reclassified from suspected cases and those
removed from the suspected SARS list was roughly one to
one. Therefore, reporting and admitting suspected cases
appeared to have worked in identifying SARS cases.
Nonetheless, almost 73% of all traceable infections in
Taiwan occurred in hospital settings (Chwan-Chuan King,
unpub. data). Hence, determining the circumstances under
which these infections occurred is of interest.
To this end, we considered a model with susceptible
patients (Sn), hospitalized suspected case-patients (Hn),
reported probable SARS case-patients (In), and the accu-
mulated SARS deaths (Dn). The exposed population was
not considered since there had been no documented evi-
dence of transmission before onset of symptoms (11).
Persons suspected of having SARS were admitted when
they had onset of some symptoms combined with a record
of recent exposure. Such admission procedures, as well as
the protocols for reclassification and downgrading of
cases, were carried out in compliance with WHO stan-
dards. The flow diagram of the model dynamics is given in
Figure 2. The details of the model, including the assump-
tions made, model equations, and the model parameters,
are given in Appendix 1. 
We used the daily cumulative numbers of reported sus-
pected cases, probable cases, and deaths from May 5 to
June 4 for the true data for the respective numbers for Hn,
In, and Dn in our model. We chose the data period
May 5–June 4 for expediency: it was the only period when
all three numbers could be extracted from the Taiwan
Center for Disease Control Web site data. We purposely
used the number of probable cases by reporting date
instead of by onset date to capture what truly happened
clinically and in hospital at various stages of a patient’s
clinical progression.
To simplify our estimation procedure, we discarded the
time dependence (or subscript n) of each parameter, thus
considering the parameters as mean estimates of the vari-
able parameters over the period considered. The model
equations were simplified to a linear system of simultane-
ous difference equations with which data can be easily
implemented for the parameter estimation procedure. We
used the three-stage least squares (3SLS) procedure com-
monly used in econometrics, which provides a useful
parameter estimation procedure for simultaneous equa-
tions (12). The details of the estimation method are again
given in Appendix 2. 
Results
The parameters estimated, without the subscripts, are: λ
and β (the respective admission rates due to contact with
probable and suspected case-patients at time n-3); ξ
(admission rate due to contact with probable case-patient
at time n); α (rule out rate of uninfected hospitalized per-
sons at time n); γ (reclassification rate of suspected SARS
case-patients to probable at time n); σ (discharge rate of
probable SARS patients at time n); ρ (death rate of proba-
ble SARS patients at time n). Note that, by their defini-
tions, α, γ, σ, and ρ are proportions between 0 and 1.
From the estimation results, the contributions of con-
tacts of probable case-patients to the suspected SARS
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Figure 1. The number of new probable cases in Taiwan by
reporting date, April 22-June 4, 2003.
Figure 2. Flow diagram for the model dynamics of the model pro-
posed.population (λ and ξ) are not significantly different from
zero. Hence, almost all SARS-infected persons had symp-
toms and were admitted before their infections were
reclassified from suspected to probable SARS. This find-
ing could indicate efficient admission, slow reclassifica-
tion process, or a mixture of both. The high percentage of
nosocomial infections in Taiwan (73% of all traceable
cases) suggests that infection from hospitalized suspected
case-patients while they waited to be reclassified (and
were subsequently placed in negative-pressure rooms) is a
major factor in the spread of disease. Most of the newly
admitted suspected case-patients were found by onset of
symptoms combined with record of contact with other sus-
pected cases of >3 days before (i.e., Hn-3). We also attempt-
ed to fit the data for possible contacts with In-k and Hn-k for
k = 1 to 7 (given that the incubation time has been estimat-
ed at 2 to 7 days). Only Hn-3 turned out to be a significant
source of contact for the suspected case-patients. This
finding gives a time from infection to onset of >3 days.
The results of the parameter estimations are given in
Table 1 with the 90% confidence interval (CI) and p value,
when appropriate. ρ and β are estimated directly from our
estimation procedure of the simultaneous equations with
the 90% CI and p values. σ, along with the 90% CI and
p value, is obtained through an estimate of 1–ρ–σ; γ is
computed from estimate of γδ. α is calculated from the
estimate of a product involving δ, γ, and α, from which the
90% CI and p value cannot be easily obtained. The mean
proportion of SARS-infected persons among suspected
case-patients δ over the period was obtained by using the
fact that during the period observed, 1,175 suspected cases
were under review. Of these, 562 were reclassified as prob-
able and 613 removed from the category of suspected
cases. So we let δ = 562/1175 = 0.4783. The p values indi-
cate that the quality of model fit is good. The numbers
computed from the model were plotted against the real
data in Figure 3A-C.
To make the results more transparent, we used the mean
estimates of daily rates to calculate the mean interval for
progression through various stages, given in Table 2. The
time from admission to reclassification as a probable case
is estimated as 1/γ; time from admission to removal from
suspected SARS case list is 1/α; time for classification as
a probable case to death is 1/ρ multiplied by 0.15, the over-
all case-fatality rate of SARS patients, as estimated by
WHO; the time from probable case to discharge is 1/α
multiplied by 0.85, the cure rate. 
Discussion
In our study, the gap between mean time from admis-
sion to reclassification as probable SARS case-patient was
12.56 days; and the mean time from admission to a case’s
being ruled out as a SARS case was 2.11 days. When first
admitted with symptoms, a patient is treated with an
antimicrobial drug. When the symptoms subsequently sub-
side, the patient status is usually downgraded and the
patient is removed from the category of suspected SARS
case-patients after a few days of observation. Moreover,
anyone who is symptomatic, had contact with this person,
but shows no lingering symptoms will also be subsequent-
ly quickly downgraded. Hence, a mean estimate of 2.11
days from admission to being ruled out as a case seems
reasonable. On the other hand, if the antimicrobial treat-
ment does not yield marked improvement, a person is kept
under observation for >7 days, when either lung x-rays or
other tests (antibody test or polymerase chain reaction)
will determine if the patient’s case should be reclassified as
probable SARS. The mean of 12.56 days suggests some
delay, either in the cross-checking of diagnostic test results
or in the reporting procedure. Confusion regarding case
definition and diagnostic procedure (13) might also con-
tribute to the delay. The mean time from classification of a
case as probable to death is 24.31 days, implying a mean
admission to death time of 36.87 days. The estimate is
slightly higher than that for Hong Kong estimated by
Donnelly et al. (14) (Table 3). However, this quantity is
highly correlated to how quickly a person with onset of
symptoms is admitted. As demonstrated with the Hong
Kong data (14), the maximum likelihood mean time from
onset to admission decreased as the epidemic progressed,
probably reflecting a heightened alertness in the general
public as well as the health profession. Given the near-
panic in Taipei evident from the end of April to most of
May, many infected persons (and many non-SARS
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Table 1. The model parameter values with 90% confidence interval (CI) and p values, when appropriate
a 
Parameter  Estimated value  90% CI  p value 
SARS
b death rate  ρ =0.0062  0.0023 to 0.00101  0.0125 
Discharge rate of probable case-patients  σ =0.0747  0.000
c to 0.1500  <0.0001
d 
Admission rate of suspected case-patients  β =0.3370  0.0814 to 0.5927  0.0336 
Reclassification rate from suspected to probable case  γ =0.0797  0.0281 to 0.1311  0.0142
e 
Rule-out rate of suspected cases  α =0.4271  0.3571 to 0.5927  - 
Proportion of probable cases in suspected class  δ =0.4783  -  - 
aAll rates are per day. 
bSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome. 
cMax{0,-0.0046}. 
dp value for 1–ρ–σ. 
ep value for γδ. patients as well) were reported and admitted quickly.
However, the fact that most of the infections had occurred
in hospital settings highlights the inadequacies in hospital
management during this period to effectively isolate sus-
pected SARS case-patients, and instead allowing the
spread of SARS to medical staff, other patients, and visi-
tors to the hospital wards.
The total time from admission to discharge for a SARS
patient was 23.94 days. To obtain a “mean effective repro-
ductive number for the observed time period,” R*, we use
the mean admission rate by suspected cases (β) and multi-
ply it by the mean time the person spent as a suspected
case-patient before reclassification (12.56 days) to get R*
= 4.23. However, this figure might be an overestimate
because of uncertainty regarding how infectious a SARS
patient is, relative to the change in his or her viral load
(15). Note also that the term “mean” refers to averaging
over the observed period, to distinguish from the effective
reproductive number at time t, Rt (6,7). Figure 1 shows the
increases of probable cases in the first 20 days of the peri-
od considered, followed by a leveling off of cases. Since β
is the effective infection rate of one SARS patient (and
also the product of effective contact rate and transmission
probability per contact), three factors stood out as critical
to any control measure for a SARS outbreak: 1) effective
isolation of admitted patients to decrease contact rate, 2)
improved safety precautions for hospital staff to lower
transmission probability in case of close contact, and 3)
shortened reclassification time so that the probable cases-
patients can be identified swiftly and put in negative-pres-
sure isolation rooms. A breakdown in any of these meas-
ures would lead to temporary failure of the whole system,
as witnessed in the outbreak in Taiwan.
Conclusion
The results for the mean effective reproductive number,
R*, suggest that the easiest way to reduce infections is
more efficient diagnosis of the probable SARS case-
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Figure 3. A, number of hospitalized suspected case-patients (Hn)
computed from the model compared with real data from May 5 to
June 4, 2003. B, number of reported probable case-patients (In)
computed from the model compared with real data from May 5 to
June 4. C, cumulative number of deaths due to severe acute res-
piratory syndrome (Dn) computed from the model compared with
real data from May 5 to June 4.
A
B
C
Table 2. Estimated intervals of epidemiologic importance for 
SARS outbreaks, Taiwan, May 5–June 4, 2003
a 
Interval for:  Mean estimate (days) 
Admission to reclassification as probable 
case-patient  12.56 
Admission to removal from suspected 
case-patient category  2.11 
Probable case classification to death  24.31 
Probable case classification to discharge  11.38 
aSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome. 
Table 3. Comparison of the estimated intervals from admission to 
death or discharge for SARS patients in Taiwan with those from 
Hong Kong study
a 
  Days 
Interval for:  Taiwan  Hong Kong 
Admission to designation as a probable 
case-patient to death  36.87  35.9 
Admission to designation as a probable 
case-patient to discharge  23.94  23.5 
aBy Donnelly et al. (13). SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome. patients and their speedy isolation in negative-pressure
rooms. In light of the present lack of accurate diagnostic
testing for SARS, public health measures aimed at more
efficient clinical diagnosis, isolation of suspected case-
patients, and reclassification procedures could greatly
reduce the number of infections in future outbreaks. Such
steps could be accomplished by quickly identifying the
true suspected SARS cases, speedy reporting, effective in-
hospital isolation, and fast reclassification of the SARS
patients.
The quarantine implemented in Taiwan resulted in only
a small number of persons later diagnosed as suspected or
probable case-patients. However, one can only speculate
about the number of additional infections that the quaran-
tine of these few patients prevented. Events in Canada, for
example, demonstrated how one misreported case could
lead to an entirely new wave of infections. While there is
ample evidence that the quarantine implemented by sever-
al countries was instrumental in stopping the spread of
SARS, the important public health policy decision of using
quarantine as an intervention measure, weighed against its
socioeconomic costs, requires further studies with better
data and more detailed mathematical modeling.
We had attempted to obtain the estimates by splitting
the observed time period into two distinct intervals to see
if the three factors involved indeed show a decrease during
the course of the observed period. Unfortunately, limited
data size inhibits such an endeavor. With the help of Center
for Disease Control of Taiwan, more extensive data are
currently being collected and generated, including infor-
mation on the chains of infections as well as clusters. Such
data collection takes time, involving the difficult task of
contact tracing, but it will form the basis of a more com-
prehensive modeling study in the future, one that can
account for the complete sequence of events.
From the model, it is also clear that the estimated
parameters should be time-dependent. However, given the
limited data available, one must make simplifications to
estimate the means of the parameters over the observed
period. With more and better data, one could perhaps esti-
mate the parameters over smaller periods of interest during
the complete progression of the epidemic, if not the param-
eter values for each time n.
Another crucial factor in the outbreak is spatial hetero-
geneity (i.e., diversity in spatial dimension, brought on by
the factor of distance). As Hoping Hospital was closed on
April 24 in the aftermath of cluster infections, its patients
were allowed to disperse freely to other hospitals; some
transferred though the medical system, others on their
own. This dispersal of infected persons was directly
responsible for several hospital cluster infections in Taipei
and even one in Kaohsiung, the southern port city, the
effect of which cannot be examined without introducing
spatial heterogeneity into the model. Dye and Gay (8) have
presented a lucid argument for the confounding role of het-
erogeneity in epidemic models. Heterogeneity, regardless
of whether in host, transmission, spatial, or any other form,
cannot be easily conveyed in a complicated general model.
One needs to design specific models with a specifically
generated dataset to address specific situations. The spread
of SARS thus far has been highly society-dependent: under
different social settings, SARS has gained foothold in each
country or region in a different way, albeit only shortly, be
it Hong Kong, Singapore, Toronto, China, or Taiwan. As a
long-term goal, to achieve global eradication of the SARS-
CoV, one must understand each distinct pattern of trans-
mission, perhaps by distinct and specific SARS modeling.
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Appendix 1. The Model
Model Variables
Sn – The number of susceptible persons at time t = n.
Hn – The number of hospitalized suspected case-patients at
time t = n.
In – The number of living probable SARS case-patients at
time t = n.
Dn – The cumulative number of SARS deaths at time t = n.
Note that time unit is in days.
Assumptions
A person is moved out of susceptible class only after onset of
symptoms and/or having a close contact with a probable case-
patient.
An infective person can infect others at either suspected or
probable stages.
Ahospitalized suspected case-patient is removed from the sus-
pected class either by reclassification to a probable SARS case-
patient or by returning to susceptible class with no immunity. (If
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immunity. For the present model this assumption is not important
for our estimation result.)
Parameters
λn – Admission rate due to contact with probable SARS case-
patient at time n–3.
βn – Admission rate due to contact with suspected case-
patient at time n–3.
ξn – Admission rate due to contacts with probable case-patient
at time n.
αn – Rule-out rate of uninfected hospitalized persons at time n. 
γn – Reclassification rate of suspected SARS case-patients to
probable at time n.
σn – Discharge rate of probable SARS patients at time n.
ρn – Fatality rate of probable SARS patients at time n.
δn – Proportion of infected persons among all suspected case-
patients at time n.
Note that αn, γn, σn, ρn, and δn are proportions between 0 and 1.
The model equations, which describe the change in the model
variables from time n to n+1, are as follows:
with
.
The flow diagram for the dynamics is given in Figure 2.
Since the equations for Hn+1,I n+1 and Dn+1 involve only Hn, In
and Dn, we can consider these three equations in a simple model
which can be put in the following matrix form:
The data for Hn, In, and Dn, the respective numbers of admitted
suspected case-patients, reported probable SARS case-patients,
and SARS deaths, are available for parameter estimation.
Appendix 2. Estimation Method
We treat the linear system of equations above as a multiequa-
tion simulation model, which allows us to account for the inter-
relationship within a set of variables, namely, Hn, In, and Dn,
which are called endogenous variables in econometrics (11).
Two-stage least squares (2SLS) and 3SLS can both provide a
very useful estimation procedure for simultaneous equation.
However, 2SLS is inefficient when the system of equations con-
tains lagged dependent variables, which account for adjustments
that take place over time. We can achieve a gain in efficiency by
applying 3SLS. It involves applying generalized least squares
estimation to a system of equations, each of which has first been
estimated using 2SLS. The 3SLS procedure yields more efficient
parameter estimates than does 2SLS because it takes into account
the cross-equation correlation.
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